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Annual
St. Cloud State University
Student Research Colloquium 2001
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Session E Abstracts
Bringing Them to Us and Us to Them: Student-Produced Theatre Northern
Irish Drama "Carthaginians"
Neil Dunn, Bethany Urban and Hanni Baugh
Sponsor: Andrew Vorder Bruegge
St. Cloud State
University, Theatre, Film Studies and Dance
The main challenge in the entirely student produced and directed production
of Carthaginians was to present an Irish subject to an American
audience and to create a feeling of connection with that subject. Through
the filter of American eyes (often filtered through American media),
Northern Ireland, like so many other countries where conflict exists,
often becomes an "us and them" situation. It is, however, important to
remember that the human capacity for emotion and feeling is the same
everywhere, perhaps even heightened in areas that have experienced the
political hardships that Northern Ireland has. The events of 30 January
1972 forever shattered the emotional conscious of the people of Derry,
Northern Ireland. Carthaginians deals with the after-effects
of Bloody Sunday on seven Derry characters who were present that day.
The play explores the psychology of mourning, remorse, and hope through
these seven characters.
Presentation Index: E1
The Irrationality of Belief
Guy Rice
Sponsor: Susanna Nuccetelli
St. Cloud State University,
Philosophy
All belief is fundamentally irrational. Epistemologists, those who study
knowledge, have struggled for millenia with the problem of finding a
satisfactory basis for justifying belief. Actually, what they've done
is try to avoid the fact that perfectly clear and valid criteria have
been known for millenia, but that no belief can ever satisfy them. They
have avoid this because this view leads to skepticism. As an irrational
Pyrrhonist, I demonstrate why common sense and rational thinking lead
to the inevitable conclusion that given any proposition P, one can never
have better founded reasons for believing P than believing not P. This
view is also known as irrationalism, anti-rationalism, or rational nihilism,
although I object to the latter terms, as I argue that acceptance of
this view does not necessarily lead to a rejection of rationality. Rather,
it leads to a better understanding of what rationality can and (perhaps
more importantly) cannot do, thus what cannot be reasonably expected
of it, such as expecting it to provide a foundation for beliefs. Various
attempts to provide support for beliefs are discussed and demonstrated
to be insufficient. Specifically, foundationalism is shown to be a form
of irrationalism, and coherentism is shown to be both a form of irrationalism
and relativism. In fact, whether explicitly stated or not, all supposedly
rational accounts of belief ultimately advocate that beliefs be accepted
on faith, they only differ in what one should have faith in, and can
provide no support for why their articles of faith are more valid than
any rival set. The validity of any belief can only be judged relative
to the context of a belief system which cannot be rationally justified.
Thus, I banish the irrational notion of rational belief.
Presentation Index: E2
Testimony, Rationality and the Belief in God
Lawrence Giebenhain
Sponsor: Susanna Nuccetelli
St. Cloud State University,
Philosophy
Alston argues that God exists due to several reasons. One of these deals
with the fact that there is no way to confirm that a belief that one
holds about God due to a supernatural experience is false. This problem
occurs because there are no qualified witnesses to confer with, as there
would be about some form of empirical evidence. Alston aligns the perception
of God and belief of God's existence with the perception of the senses
concerning the physical world. Cormen, Leherer, and Pappas argue against
Alston's claim by giving examples of how perception of the senses with
regard to the physical world differs conclusively to those of the spiritual
realm. They also have arguments to counter Alston's other reasons backing
the existence of God. I will agree with both sides on some of the key
materials brought up, but feel more sympathetic toward the reasoning
of Alston.
Presentation Index: E3
Dilemmas of Reflective Equilibrium
Keith Johnson
Sponsor: Susanna Nuccetelli
St. Cloud State University,
Philosophy
Questing for justification of deductive inference, Nelson Goodman attempts
to justify his theory of reflective equilibrium. He states that if a
deduction is valid, it conforms to a valid set of rules. Naturally, one
is inclined to question how these rules are determined to be valid. Instead
of alluding to his predecessors, Goodman appeals to "accepted deductive
practice". This creates a notable circularity in argument form. Goodman
maintains that this circle is not vicious, but virtuous. I argue that
such circular argumentation is not justification for deductive inference,
and terms like "virtuous", hardly apply to Goodman's reflective equilibrium.
Presentation Index: E4
The Rationality and Objectivity of Science
Michael Paggen
Sponsor: Susanna Nuccetelli
St. Cloud State University,
Philosophy
Science is commonly taken to be among the most objective and rational
pursuits. However, the history of modern science has seen the rise and
fall of several different paradigms, all of which, in their own time,
were the accepted world view. If the world view of the established scientific
community is so apt to change over time, then can we really call science
objective? Furthermore, how do we decide which world view it is more
rational to accept? In this essay, I will discuss some of the problems
of science, specifically the problems of induction and underdetermination.
And I will argue that although the process of science may have some claim
to objectivity and rationality, the paradigms that we construct based
on scientific evidence do not constitute an objective world view.
Presentation Index: E5
Ascribing Rationality
J. Christopher Joiner
Sponsor: Susanna Nuccetelli
St. Cloud State University,
Philosophy
Within the topics of translation and interpretation, there has been
a much work done by philosophers of language in the late twentieth century
regarding the notions of "charity" and "ascription of rationality". Ascription
of rationality is seen as integral to the process of good interpretation.
When a translator is confronted with an incoherent translation, one assumes
that there is something wrong with the translation. This is how rationality
gets ascribed, and is more charitable than assuming the translatee is
incoherent. This essay analyses several conceptualist's approaches and
their varying degrees of rationality. The views of Davidson, Holles and
Stitch are the focus of both praise and criticism. Using examples that
appeal to intuition, this essay recommends some sort of distinction in
the concept of rationality between intellectual understanding and interpretive
understanding. Making this distinction has an effect on things like bizarre
religious beliefs. An effect that may be more comfortable than the ultimatum
between either our translation system being wrong or that we are dealing
with nonsense. The critical element of this essay takes this ultimatum
as its primary target. There are several different approaches mentioned;
such as an analysis of the concept of nonsense and meaninglessness which
are portrayed as being overly clumsy. This discussion meanders through
issues of rationality, nonsense, meaning and meaninglessness and of course
cultural relativism.
Presentation Index: E6
Behaviorism and Rationality
James Newman
Sponsor: Susanna Nuccetelli
St. Cloud State University,
Philosophy
Abstract was not available at the time of printing.
Presentation Index: E7
Karl Popper
Justin Cox
Sponsor: Susanna Nuccetelli
St. Cloud State University,
Philosophy
This presentation considered for the 2001 Philosophy Colloquium is about
Karl Popper's hypothesis, concerning the scientific model for composing
theories and his refutation hypothesis. The presentation will include
a summary of Popper's hypothesis for model of refutation. Some arguments
against Karl Popper will then be addressed, including Kuhn's infamous "Dirty
Trick Argument". Finally, in an attempt to save Popper's hypothesis,
a few replies against the objections of this hypothesis will be explained,
in order to gain a better understanding of the model of refutation and
support for the Philosophy of Science.
Presentation Index: E8
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